University of Florida Levin College of Law

UF Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

10-1-2006

School Discipline 101: Students' Due Process
Rights in Expulsion Hearings
Melissa Frydman
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, frydman@illinois.edu

Shani M. King
University of Florida Levin College of Law, kings@law.ufl.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub
Part of the Education Law Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, and the Juveniles
Commons
Recommended Citation
Melissa Frydman & Shani M. King, School Discipline 101: Students' Due Process Rights in Expulsion Hearings, Clearinghouse Rev., Sept.Oct. 2006, at 370, available at http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/233

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact outler@law.ufl.edu.

School Discipline 101:

Students’ Due Process Rights
in Expulsion Hearings
By Melissa Frydman and Shani King

Melissa Frydman
Senior Staff Attorney
Shani M. King
Staff Attorney
Legal Services for Children
1264 Market St., 3d Floor
San Francisco, CA 94102
415.863.3762
melissa@lsc-sf.org
shani@lsc-sf.org

U

pholding the principle that school districts, as state actors, shall not deprive a
student of liberty or property without due process of law, courts have expanded
for more than four decades the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process
protection of public school students. Understanding this principle is essential to
representing children in school discipline proceedings. Before presenting a practical
guide to representing students in these proceedings, we offer a brief history of due
process protection for children.
I.	 Before Goss v. Lopez: 1954–1975

The history of due process standards in school discipline proceedings probably
begins with the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which says, inter
alia: “No state shall … deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.”1 In 1954 in Bolling v. Sharpe, a companion case to Brown v. Board of
Education, the U.S. Supreme Court construed the word “liberty” to encompass a
child’s right to a public education.2 Bolling was a class action brought on behalf of
eleven black students who challenged segregation in the public schools of the District
of Columbia. In ruling for the plaintiffs the Court, led by Chief Justice Earl Warren,
relied on the guarantee of liberty in the due process clause to recognize that the concept of liberty encompasses a child’s right to a public education.3
Notwithstanding Bolling, before 1961 due process played a “negligible role in school
and college discipline” proceedings.4 This near absence of due process protection
began to change that year when the Fifth Circuit decided Dixon v. Alabama State Board
of Education.5 The plaintiffs in Dixon were African American students (all at Alabama
State College) who engaged in various acts of civil disobedience to challenge legal segregation. Heeding an explicit request from Alabama’s governor, the state summarily
expelled six of the students without notice or hearing. In response, the students, alleging that they had been denied due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment,
sought injunctive relief in federal court.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

1

Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

2

Bolling, 347 U.S. at 497. (While the U.S. Supreme Court relied on the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause because
the Fourteenth Amendment applies to states, not to the District of Columbia, the same due process standard is widely
understood to apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.)
3

4
William G. Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 University
Pennsylvania Law Review 545, 552 (1971).

of

Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).

5
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Due process requires, the Fifth Circuit
held in ruling for the plaintiffs, notice
and some opportunity for a hearing
before students at a public college may be
expelled for misconduct. Judge Richard
Rives reasoned:

only in the Fifth Circuit, Dixon set a
precedent that notice and a hearing must
precede expulsion from public colleges
and universities, and the decision set in
motion a domino effect of policy change
at institutions of higher learning.8

The precise nature of the private
interest involved in this case is
the right to remain at a public institution of higher learning in which the plaintiffs were
students in good standing. It
requires no argument to demonstrate that education is vital, and
indeed, basic to civilized society.
Without sufficient education the
plaintiffs would not be able to
earn an adequate livelihood, to
enjoy life to the fullest, or to
fulfill as completely as possible
the duties and responsibilities
of good citizens. There was no
offer to prove that other colleges
are open to the plaintiffs. If so,
the plaintiffs would nonetheless
be injured by the interruption of
their course of studies in midterm…. Indeed, expulsion may
well prejudice the student in
completing his education at any
other institution.6

Only six years later, in 1967, the Supreme
Court decided In re Gault and revolutionized due process protection in juvenile court proceedings.9 In Gault the
Court continued to lay a foundation for
explicit recognition of the due process
rights of school-age children under the
Fourteenth Amendment.

The court in Dixon further opined that the
example the Alabama Board of Education
set could have “broken the spirits of the
expelled students and of others familiar
with injustice” and that “it is shocking
that the officials of a state educational
institution, which can function properly only if our freedoms are preserved,
should not understand the elementary
principles of fair play.”7 While binding

Fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault lived in
Arizona and was charged with making
lewd phone calls.10 After being found
delinquent in juvenile court, Gerald was
sentenced to reform school until he was
21 years old, even though the maximum
sentence an adult would have received
for the same offense was a $50 fine or
imprisonment of not more than two
months.11 Gerald and his parents had no
right to appeal the juvenile case under
Arizona law; instead Gerald filed a writ of
habeas corpus with the Arizona Supreme
Court and subsequently appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court, where he argued
that he had been denied due process of
law at trial.12
Writing for the Court, Justice Fortas
stated that “neither the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for
adults alone.”13 The Court reversed the
juvenile court’s finding of delinquency
and held that a minor was entitled to
the following procedural protections in
a juvenile delinquency proceeding: (1)
specific and timely notice of the charges,

Id. at 157.

6

Id. at 157–58.

7

Student Procedural Due Process 2006, Commonwealth Educational Policy Institute Education Law Newsletter (Commonw. Educ.
Pol’y Inst., Va. Commonw. Univ., Richmond, Va.), Feb. 2006, at cepionline.org.
8

In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See, e.g., Buss, supra note 4, at 558.

9

10

Gault. 387 U.S. at 7–8.

11

Id.; Buss, supra note 4, at 557.

12

Gault, 387 U.S. at 10.

13

Id. at 14.
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(2) legal counsel, (3) protection from
self-incrimination, and (4) confrontation and cross-examination of adverse
witnesses.14 While In re Gault was limited
to juvenile delinquency proceedings, it
continued to lay a foundation for what
was to come in the late 1960s and 1970s
in cases involving minors.15
In 1969 the Supreme Court decided the
landmark case of Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District.16
In Tinker parents sued the school district
on behalf of their children to obtain an
injunction against enforcement of a regulation that prohibited students, while
on school grounds, from wearing black
armbands to protest the Vietnam war.17
The petitioners alleged, inter alia, that
enforcement of the policy violated the
students’ rights to free speech and freedom of expression under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.
Justice Fortas’s majority opinion in Tinker
began with the now oft-repeated “It can
hardly be argued that either students or
teachers shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.”18 The Court then held
that, absent a finding that the armbands
would “substantially interfere with the
work of the school” or “impinge upon
the rights of other students,” the policy
prohibiting black armbands violated the
students’ constitutional rights to freedom of speech and expression.19 In so
holding, the Court borrowed language
from Justice Brennan in an earlier case:
“The vigilant protection of constitutional
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in
the community of American schools.”20

372

II.	 Procedural Due Process in
Public Schools

More than two decades after Bolling
established education as a liberty interest that the due process clause protected, the Supreme Court addressed the
procedural due process rights of public
school students in Goss v. Lopez.21 The
Ohio public school students who brought
that class action lawsuit argued that their
suspension from high school without a
hearing of any kind violated their due
process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The students sought (1) a
declaration that the Ohio law granting
authority for the suspension was unconstitutional, (2) an injunction against
future suspension pursuant to this law,
and (3) removal of any reference in their
records to suspension instituted pursuant to this law. The law, Ohio Revised
Code Annotated § 3313.64, empowered
a principal to suspend a student for misconduct for up to ten days, provided that
the principal notified the student’s parents within twenty-four hours and stated
the reasons for the suspension.22
A student’s attendance at public
school, the Court said in an opinion by
Justice White, is a property right that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects. The
Court reasoned (1) that “protected property interests are normally ‘not created
by the constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined’
by an independent source such as state
statutes or rules entitling the citizen to
certain benefits,” and (2) that Ohio’s
compulsory attendance statute granted
all Ohio children between the ages of

14

Id.

15

Student Procedural Due Process 2006, supra note 8.

16

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).

17

Id. at 504.

18

Id. at 506.

19

Id. at 508.

20

Id. at 512 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).

21

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).

22

Id. at 567.
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5 and 21 a “legitimate claim of entitlement to a public education.”23 Justice
White explained that “having chosen
to extend the right to an education …
Ohio may not withdraw that right on
grounds of misconduct, absent fundamentally fair procedures to determine
whether the misconduct has occurred.”24
The Court emphasized that the state had
broad authority to prescribe and enforce
conduct in its schools but that the state
must exercise its authority to constrain a
student’s property right to education in
accordance with the Constitution.
Then, in keeping with the historical view
of the right to an education as a liberty interest, the Court reasoned that the
application of the Ohio law also collided
with the students’ liberty interests:
The Due Process Clause also
forbids arbitrary deprivations
of liberty. “Where a person’s
good name, reputation, honor,
or integrity is at stake because
of what the government is doing
to him,” the minimal requirements of the Clause must be
satisfied. [Citations omitted].
School authorities here suspended appellees for periods of
up to 10 days based on charges
of misconduct. If sustained and
recorded, those charges could
seriously damage the students’
standing with their fellow pupils
and their teachers as well as
interfere with later opportunities for higher education and
employment. It is apparent that
the claimed right of the State
to determine unilaterally and
without process whether that

misconduct has occurred immediately collides with the requirements of the Constitution.25
The Goss Court, having recognized the
property and liberty interests implicated
in depriving a student of an educational
placement, then held that “at the very
minimum, students facing suspension
and the consequent interference with
a protected property interest must be
given some kind of notice and some kind
of hearing.”26 The Court further held that
“due process requires, in connection with
a suspension of 10 days or less, that the
student be given oral or written notice of
the charges against him and, if he denies
them, an explanation of the evidence the
authorities have and an opportunity to
present his side of the story.”27
While Goss established a new property
right and additional protection for students, the Court predictably refused to
articulate an inflexible procedure under
the due process clause because the nature
of the new right’s application made it
impossible to create procedures that
would fit every situation.28 And, although
Goss did not involve expulsions per se,
the Court opined that “longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder
of the school term, or permanently, may
require more formal procedures,” leaving the door open for courts to implement more formal Gault-like requirements in cases of longer suspension and
expulsion.29
III.	 Clarification and Application

Since 1975, courts have clarified and
applied the Goss requirements. For
example, in Gonzales v. McEuen, when

23

Id. at 573 (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).

24

Id. at 574.

25

Id. at 574–75.

26

Id. at 579.

Id. at 581. Regarding the timing of this notice, the Court explained that “there need be no delay between the time
notice is given and the time of the hearing. In the great majority of cases the disciplinarian may informally discuss the
alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has occurred. We hold only that, in being given an opportunity to
explain his version of the facts at this discussion, the student first be told what he is accused of doing and what the basis
of the accusation is…. [I]t follows that as a general rule notice and hearing should precede removal of the student from
school.” Id. at 582.
27

28

Id. at 578.

29

Id. at 584.
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students in California challenged their
expulsion as violating due process,
the district court noted that “it is now
beyond argument that due process protections apply to expulsion of students
by public educational institutions.”30
The Gonzales court further clarified Goss’
application in expulsion hearings: “Goss
clearly anticipates that where the student is faced with the severe penalty of
expulsion he shall have the right to be
represented by and through counsel, to
present evidence on his own behalf, and
to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses.”31
More recently, courts interpreting Goss
have relied on the statutory law of their
own jurisdictions to elucidate due process requirements where Goss is (arguably) silent. For example, in D.F. v. Board
of Education, a federal district court in
New York quoted Goss in recognizing that
“a student has a protected property interest in education ‘which may not be taken
away for misconduct without adherence
to the minimum procedures required
by the due process clause.’”32 However,
the court turned to the state’s own statutory framework to articulate students’
due process rights in noting that “New
York Education Law provides for certain,
basic procedural protections for suspen30

sions longer than (5) days … such … [as]
… ‘representation by counsel, with the
right to question witnesses against such
pupil and to present witnesses and other
evidence on his behalf.’”33
The history of due process demonstrates
an evolving concept that forms the core
of the constitutional protections available to students. Due process is also the
foundation for the laws, regulations, and
policies upon which advocates rely in
representing students in school discipline proceedings.
IV.	 A Practical Guide to
Representing Students

With this historical perspective, we now
turn to a practical approach to suspension and expulsion cases.
A.	 State and Local Laws
and Regulations

The first step in developing a school
discipline practice is to review thoroughly your state’s laws and regulations
governing the suspension and expulsion of students.34 One positive aspect
of representing students in expulsion
hearings is that the law in this area is
relatively basic, allowing for easier mastery. In California, with rather lengthy

Gonzales v. McEuen, 435 F. Supp. 460, 466 (C.D. Cal. 1977).

Id. at 467. Other courts require a hearing incorporating these safeguards before or shortly after a child is suspended
for a prolonged or indefinite period. See Black Coalition v. Portland School District, No. 1, 484 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.
1973); Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967). As for the timing of the Goss hearing,
a federal district court in Virginia held that a right to hearing meant a “prompt hearing”; the court found that a hearing
held thirty days after a student was suspended was not prompt and was therefore impermissible under Goss. See Doe v.
Rockingham County, 658 F. Supp. 403 (W.D. Va. 1987).
31

32

D.F. v. Board of Education, 386 F. Supp. 2d 119, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Goss, 419 U.S. at 574).

33

Id.

34
Ala. Code § 16-1-14 (2006); Alaska Admin. Code tit. 4, § 07.010 (2006); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15-840 (2006); Ark. Code
Ann. § 6-18-500 (2006); Cal. Educ. Code §§ 48900-48927 (West 2006); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-32-109.1 (West 2006);
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 10-233 (West 2006); Del. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 1601 (2006); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1002 (West 2006); Ga.
Code Ann. § 20-2-730-769 (West 2006); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 8-19 (2006); Idaho Admin. Code r. 08.02.03-160 (2006); Ill. Comp.
Stat. Ann. 105 5/10-22.6 (West 2006); Ind. Code Ann. § 20-33-8 (West 2006); Iowa Code Ann. § 282.4 (West 2006); Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 72-8900 (2006); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 158.150 (as amended by 2006 Ky. Laws Ch. 139 (HB 688)); La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 17:416 (2006); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 20-A, § 1001 (2006); Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 7-305 (West 2006); Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 71, § 37H (2006); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 380.1311 (West 2006); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 121A (West 2006); Miss.
Code Ann. § 71-37 (2006); Mo. Rev. Stat § 160.261 (2006); Mont. Code Ann. § 20-5-202 (2006); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-268
(2006); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 392.4655 (West 2006); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 193:13 (2006); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:37-2 (West
2006); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-5-4.3 (West 2006); N.Y. Educ. Law § 3214 (McKinney 2005); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 115C-391
(West 2006); N.D. Cent. Code § 15.1-19-09 (2006); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.66 (West 2006); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 70,
§ 24-101.3 (West 2006); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §339.240 (West 2006); 24 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 13-1318 (West 2006); R.I.
Gen. Laws § 16-2-17 (2006); S.C. Code Ann. § 59-63-210 (2006); S.D. Codified Laws § 13-32-4 (2006); Tenn. Code Ann. §
49-6-3401 (West 2006); Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 37.007 (Vernon 2005); Utah Code Ann. § 53A-11-903 (West 2006); Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 16, § 1162 (2006); Va. Code Ann. § 22.1-277 (West 2006); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 28A.305.160 (West 2006); W.
Va. Code Ann. § 18A-5-1 (West 2006); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 119.25 (West 2006); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-4-305 (2006).
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and detailed regulations, our entire legislative scheme governing these hearings is no more than twenty-six pages.35
Further, only some fifteen reported cases
in California address and elucidate school
discipline issues. You should review any
regulations governing school discipline
matters in the individual district where
you represent a student. Many states give
districts great discretion in establishing disciplinary policies and procedures.
Local regulations may offer more information than state statutes.
Review your state regulations and case
law and any local provisions to give you
a framework of students’ due process
rights and a sense of the kinds of offenses
for which students may face suspension
or expulsion. These generally range from
the innocuous and vague (e.g., disrupting school activities) to the serious and
specific (e.g., possession of a gun).36
Equally important, however, you must
have a clear notion about acts for which
students may not be expelled. Pay particular attention to where and when the
alleged offenses took place. Some states
require that to be grounds for expulsion
a student’s offense must have occurred at
school or at a school-sponsored activity.
Others cover anything that occurs on the
way to or from school. Still others allow
expulsion for offenses that have seemingly nothing to do with school.37 States
sometimes specifically exclude a class of
offenses as grounds for expulsion (e.g.
tardiness or truancy).38 Begin by grasping the boundaries of your state and local
laws and exploring the universe of acts
that can lead to expulsion hearings.
35

Cal. Educ. Code §§ 48900–48927 (West 2006).

36

See id. §§ 48900(k) & (b).

B.	 Suspension Policies
and Procedures

Once a student is alleged to have committed an expellable offense, the student
is likely as a first step to be suspended for
a short period (e.g., one to ten days).39
Again, review state law to determine the
permissible length of suspension. Shortterm suspensions that precede expulsion
attempts are frequently extended until
the expulsion hearing is held. A basic
level of due process—usually consisting
of a meeting between student and parent and school officials to explain the
circumstances leading to the suspension and the need for ongoing suspension pending further hearing—typically
accompanies any such extensions.40
Allowing for some minimal due process
and an opportunity to be heard gives
schools legal grounds to lengthen the
suspension prior to holding an actual
disciplinary hearing with more extensive
due process rights. How long students
may be excluded from school before an
expulsion hearing varies from state to
state, but the period may extend up to
thirty consecutive school days.
These extended suspensions themselves
are a critical area for advocacy. If the
school did not comply with state law, ask
that the student be allowed to return to
school immediately, even pending further
disciplinary action. A school’s failure to
meet minimal due process requirements
for the suspension might also be a useful argument during the expulsion hearing itself. Even if an extended suspension was properly carried out, advocates

E.g., Texas has a category of offenses for which students may be expelled only if the offenses happened while on school
property and other offenses for which students may face expulsion if the offenses occurred within 300 feet of any school
campus. See Tex. Educ. Code Ann § 37.007 (Vernon 2005).
37

See Cal. Educ. Code § 48900(v) (West 2006). See also Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann § 392.467(4) (West 2006) (restricts expulsion or
suspension of truant students).
38

39
California law allows only up to five consecutive days of suspension unless a student is facing expulsion. See Cal. Educ.
Code § 48911(a) (West 2006). Cf., e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.66(A) (West 2006) (allowing suspensions for up to
ten consecutive days).

See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 53A-11-905(5)(c) (West 2006).

40
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should recognize that thirty days is a significant portion of the entire school year.
So that your client does not fall too far
behind, insist that she be given work that
allows her to keep up with classes while
she is kept out. Although procedures vary
widely, some school systems offer alternative educational venues where students
who are out of school can get some education.41 Request those opportunities and
take advantage of them when offered.
Not only can they help keep the student
from falling behind, but also attending
an alternative program can show, in an
expulsion hearing, that the student takes
school seriously and continued her studies to the extent possible even while she
was suspended.
C.	 Gathering Evidence and
Preparing Your Client

Although a ten- to thirty-day suspension while awaiting an expulsion hearing
may seem excessive from the student’s
perspective, that is a very short time
for an attorney to prepare for a hearing.42 Once you know you will represent
a client who faces an expulsion hearing,
hit the ground running. Gather all the
documents the school has regarding your
client—not only those the school will use
at the hearing but also everything the
school has about your client’s disciplinary and academic history and any records
about the incident alleged to be the basis
for the expulsion. This is your opportunity to conduct discovery. Do not define
your request so narrowly that you miss
crucial evidence.
Proper notice is an element of due process. While states vary on the exact form
of notice required, generally notice must
be in writing and detail the acts that the
student is accused of committing and
that make her eligible to be expelled.
The notice must state the intent to expel

the student and specify the student’s
procedural rights, including rights to a
hearing before an impartial fact finder,
to be represented by counsel or any nonattorney advocate, to present witnesses
and other evidence, to question any evidence and cross-examine any opposing
witnesses, and to have a recording of the
hearing itself prepared and written findings developed that support a decision
based on the evidence presented at the
hearing.43 Documents that support the
school’s determination that the student
committed an expellable offense—narrative descriptions of what the school
alleges occurred or actual witness statements—usually accompany the notice.
Narratives of school discipline history,
statements from teachers about the student’s behavior or academic standing,
and attendance and grade reports are
also common. The same packet of documents is usually sent to the student and
parent and presented to the fact finders
prior to the hearing itself. In preparing and presenting your case, you must
learn about what will already be known or
assumed about your client. You must ask
to see your client’s entire school record
and any documents the school has about
the incident in question because schools
commonly give the hearing officer only
witness statements that support the
school’s position. The student’s entire
record can give you access to documents
or evidence that call into question the
school’s version of what occurred or that
support your client’s story.
As you prepare for the hearing, be sure
to meet with your client to hear her story
of what took place. Get a detailed account
not only of the incident but also of who
might have witnessed it, what your client told others about it, and what school
staff told her. Know your client’s academic and disciplinary history from her

E.g., N.J. Stat. Ann § 18A:37-2.2 (West 2006) (offers some suspended students an “alternative education program”). Cf.
Va. Code Ann. § 22.1-277.04 (West 2006) (parents must pay for alternative education programs).

41

Some jurisdictions allow attorneys to request a continuance of the expulsion hearing in order to prepare more
adequately. However, typically that request accompanies an agreement that the student’s suspension is extended during
the continuance period. If a student is allowed to return to school pending an expulsion hearing, more preparation time is
almost always a good idea. However, if the student continues to miss school, advocates must carefully weigh the value of
the additional preparation time and the likelihood of success against the loss of instructional time.
42

For an example of a state statute that spells out the required notice elements, see Wis. Stat. Ann. § 120.13 (West
2006).
43
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perspective and acquaint yourself with
context about which the school might
be unaware or might not have considered in its investigation. Decide with
your client if you want to bring witnesses
to the hearing and whom, if anyone,
you should subpoena. Many states’ laws
provide for students to subpoena witnesses to testify at expulsion hearings.
Witnesses not only can present evidence
about the incident itself but also serve as
character witnesses. You should explore
whether people who cannot be present to
testify may be willing to write letters of
support. Decide whether your client will
testify in her own defense and know what
statements, either oral or written, she
has already made—a special precaution
for students who have also been arrested
or face juvenile delinquency charges for
the same offenses for which they face
expulsion. Because anything a minor
says during an expulsion hearing may be
used against her later in juvenile court,
be sure before the hearing to discuss
the client’s testimony with her public
defender or other attorney handling any
delinquency matters.
D.	 Hearing Officers and Impartiality

Be sure to learn who actually hears the
case in your jurisdiction. This can vary
even from district to district within a
state; fact finders range from single
individuals, such as superintendents or
administrative law judges, to panels of
administrators, to entire school boards.
Battles have been waged in many states
over fact finders’ impartiality and who
has the authority to make a final decision.
Generally a hearing officer who had no
role in the actual incident and no control
over the decision to expel the student is
deemed fair and impartial.44 However,
you should review state regulations and
case law to ensure that whoever hears
your case meets state mandates. Be sure
that the fact finders themselves appear
fair and impartial during the hearing
and that they consider only what is presented to them. Because hearing officers
are so often district officials who have
44

See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-269(2) (2006).

45

See, e.g., Gonzales, 435 F. Supp. at 463.

close, and frequently personal, relationships with school officials who are presenting the case against your client, be
attuned to information that might have
been presented outside the hearing or to
individuals who might have had access to
the hearing officers to sway their decisions outside the hearing itself. In some
states, for example, cases have addressed
the impartiality of attorneys who simultaneously advise the hearing officers and
help the school present its case against
the student.45 Watch for evidence of bias
in decision making and promptly note
any such evidence on the record.
E.	 Hearing Format and
Procedural Considerations

To prepare for the hearing, consult
someone who has represented clients at
expulsion hearings in your area. Doing
so can alert you to nuances of your audience and how the hearing will be structured. Hearings vary widely from district
to district; some are orderly and much
like minitrials, while others resemble a
three-ring circus. In either case, remember that you are making a record for a
potential appeal. Be sure to make yourself heard and note any irregularities
of format or procedure, especially any
jurisdictional questions. If you believe
the panel lacks jurisdiction—because the
incident is not an expellable offense or
did not occur on school grounds, the
school did not provide proper or timely
notice, or even that the hearing itself is
untimely, for example—note that immediately for the record.
Standards of proof will vary; be familiar
with what elements the school must prove
to expel your client. Hearing officers
often are not attorneys and are unversed
in legal requirements. A key part of your
job is to educate them. School officials
hearing these cases are often swayed by
inflammatory charges or the student’s
poor attendance record or academic
history. Legally, however, these matters
are irrelevant. Try to keep your hearing
panel focused only on what the law sets as
grounds for expulsion.
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The fundamental issue before the hearing officers will be whether the student
committed the alleged offenses and, if
so, what punishment is authorized or
fitting. State laws vary in the burden the
school must meet for different offenses.
For example, California has five “mandatory expulsion” (also referred to as “zero
tolerance”) offenses: possessing a gun,
brandishing a knife at someone, selling
drugs, committing a sexual assault, and
possessing an explosive.46 If the school
can prove that the student committed
any one of these, a hearing panel has no
choice but to expel the student.47 For any
other offense, the fact finders would also
need to make a secondary finding that
no remedy other than expulsion would
correct the student’s behavior or that
the student would pose a physical danger if she were not expelled.48 Review
your state’s procedures and case law to
know the nature of the evidence required
and how to address each element. In
California, if the student is accused of a
“mandatory expulsion” offense, attacking evidence that she committed the
offense at all is essential. With any other
type of case you can not only attack any
evidence that the student committed the
offense but also contend that neither the
incident nor the student’s history merits
the extreme punishment of expulsion.49

strong chance of defeating a school’s case
on the merits.
The kind of evidence you develop on your
client’s behalf will inevitably vary widely with individual circumstances. Even
if your client undoubtedly committed
the offense, you can present character
witnesses and have your client offer an
apology in her own words, provided that
doing so does not jeopardize the outcome
of any delinquency proceedings. Even
students who have committed expellable
offenses are entitled to due process, and
the presence of an advocate who offers
evidence and tells the student’s story
can have a major impact on whether the
student is expelled and the length of
the expulsion—and thus ultimately on
the student’s educational future. Suggest
alternative means of discipline, short of
expulsion, to demonstrate to the district
that your client understands the gravity
of the situation and is willing to address
the issues. Alternatives might include a
transfer to another comprehensive school
within the district, repair of any damage,
community service, enrollment in anger
management or counseling programs, or
anything else that might convince the
hearing officers that an outcome short of
expulsion could be effective.

F.	 Evidence

G.	 Postexpulsion Considerations
and Appeals

Know how your state addresses rules
of evidence during expulsion hearings.
Formal rules of evidence typically do
not apply, but policies vary as to whether
students may be expelled solely on the
basis of hearsay, which is often the only
evidence the school presents. Thus the
hearsay rules can be a crucial advocacy
tool. If you can establish that hearsay
evidence alone is insufficient to support
a finding against your client, you have a

Written findings of fact supported by
evidence introduced at the hearing typically must accompany a decision to expel
the student, and the decision specifies
the length of expulsion and terms for
rehabilitation. If your client is expelled,
you need to know what, if any, education services your state requires for
expelled students. The permissible
length of expulsions varies widely, and
during the hearing itself this is often an

46

Cal. Educ. Code § 48915(c) (West 2006).

However, the governing school board, which must make the final decision, may impose a “suspended expulsion” as a
lesser means of punishment. See Cal. Educ. Code § 48917 (West 2006). A “suspended expulsion” is like probation; the
student may return to school but faces reinstatement of her expulsion should she violate any school rules during the
suspended expulsion period.
47

See Cal. Educ. Code § 48915 (West 2006).

48

Before even going to hearing you should explore whether a deal akin to a “plea bargain” is possible in the district. E.g.,
the student might admit to an offense and agree to a punishment short of actual expulsion, such as transfer to another
school or district or a suspended expulsion.
49
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opportunity for arguing leniency. While
California caps expulsion at one calendar
year, some states allow longer periods
or impose no cap at all.50 Determine
what will happen if your client’s family moves to a new school district during
the expulsion term. Most states require
students to notify the new district of
their expulsion, and typically the expulsion follows the student. Students cannot
evade expulsion simply by starting over
somewhere new.
Even after a decision to expel has been
made, attorneys should carefully consider appealing that decision. Even if a
student comes to you after an expulsion
hearing at which she was not represented
by counsel, you may still be able to defeat
the expulsion order on appeal. Appeal
procedures also vary widely. You may
have to exhaust local levels of appeal
before you can seek reversal in court,
and you need to review each district’s
regulations. In California the first level
of appeal is to the county board of education and must be made within thirty days
of the decision.51 These appeals are not
rehearings; rather, their primary focus
is on narrow jurisdictional or abuse-ofdue-process grounds.52 Particularly in
districts where proper procedures are
routinely ignored, appeals can be quite
effective in forcing school districts to
follow the law.
H.	 Issues for Further Research
and Consideration

Although three issues are beyond the
scope of this overview, advocates should
consider and further research them:
disability, racial discrimination, and
language access. Find out right away

whether the student you are representing
receives special education services. The
Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act especially protects students with disabilities in school discipline matters.53
Attorneys should also be attuned to discriminatory discipline that treats students
of one race differently from others and
consider filing complaints with the U.S.
Department of Education Office of Civil
Rights. Students with limited English
proficiency and their families may have
special due process needs with regard to
notice and translation. Consider these
issues and raise them during the expulsion process on a case-by-case basis.
■

■

■

Expulsion hearings and the due process rights that shape them—the legacy
of Goss v. Lopez—are a fundamental aspect
of our educational system. The stakes in
these cases are high in that students face
deprivation of even basic educational
instruction for anywhere from months to
years. Although hundreds of thousands of
expulsion hearings take place every year
across the country, relatively few attorneys or advocates, particularly in lowincome communities of color, take on
these administrative matters and defend
students’ rights. As school districts grow
used to parents’ and students’ failure to
understand or enforce their rights, these
districts increasingly cut corners and
fail to follow established legal mandates
and precedents. As a result, our children suffer and their future is irreparably damaged. If advocates and attorneys
undertake even a handful of school discipline hearings, school districts will be
reminded not to ignore the law and deny
students their constitutional rights.

50
See Cal. Educ. Code § 48916 (West 2006). New Hampshire, e.g., has no cap on expulsion periods. See N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 193:13 (2006). Cf. Or. Rev. Stat. Ann § 339.250 (5) (West 2006) (students may not be expelled for more than one
calendar year).
51

See Cal. Educ. Code § 48919 (West 2006).

52

See id. § 48922.

See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k) (2006); Eileen L. Ordover, Disciplinary Exclusion of Students with Disabilities, 34 Clearinghouse
Review 50 (May–June 2000).
53
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